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Abstract:  
Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in 
philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as 
physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the 
philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental 
problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the ‘hard problem of 
consciousness,’ whereas under microexperientialism we have the ‘subject 
combination problem.’ I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having 
no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to semantic paradoxes, they 
exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective 
ontologies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
While advances in technology – enabled by the predictive models of science – have influenced 
early 21st century culture more than anything else, questions of ontology loom large in the 
contemporary psyche: What is the nature of reality? What is the essence of phenomenal 
consciousness and how does it relate to matter? Our tentative answers to these questions color – if 
not outright determine – our view of life’s meaning, thereby underlying every aspect of our 
existence. 
 Philosophy has not been idle in face of the demand for a menu of hypotheses in this regard. 
The mainstream physicalist ontology, for instance, posits that reality is constituted by irreducible 
physical entities – which Strawson has called ‘ultimates’ [21, p. 9] – outside and independent of 
phenomenality. According to physicalism, these ultimates, in and of themselves, do not instantiate 
phenomenal properties. In other words, there is nothing it is like to be an ultimate, phenomenality 
somehow emerging only at the level of complex arrangements of ultimates. As such, under 
physicalism phenomenality is not fundamental, but instead reducible to physical parameters of 
arrangements of ultimates. 
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What I shall call ‘microexperientialism,’ in turn, posits that there is already something it is 
like to be at least some ultimates, combinations of these experiencing ultimates somehow leading to 
more complex experience [21, pp. 24 – 29]. As such, under microexperientialism phenomenality is 
seen as an irreducible aspect of at least some ultimates. The ontology of panexperientialism [8, pp. 
77 – 116], [16, pp. 91 – 103], [20, pp. 21 – 22] is analogous to microexperientialism, except in that 
the former entails the stronger claim that all ultimates instantiate phenomenal properties. 
Micropsychism [21, pp. 24 – 29] and panpsychism [20, pp. 15 – 22] are analogous – maybe 
even identical – to microexperientialism and panexperientialism, respectively, except perhaps in 
that some formulations of the former admit cognition – a more complex form of phenomenality – 
already at the level of ultimates, as an irreducible aspect of these ultimates. 
 Among microexperientialism, panexperientialism, micropsychism and panpsychism, 
microexperientialism makes the narrowest claim and, therefore, is the most generic. In a strong 
sense, panexperientialism, micropsychism and panpsychism are variations or extensions of 
microexperientialism, the latter being the canonical basis of all four ontologies. Therefore, I shall 
henceforth speak only of microexperientialism. 
Whereas microexperientialism entails that bottom-up combinations of simple subjects give 
rise to more complex ones, such as human beings, cosmopsychism [15], [18] takes the opposite 
route: according to it, the cosmos as a whole is conscious, individual psyches arising from top-down 
discontinuity in the integration of the contents of cosmic consciousness. Cosmopsychism can also 
be interpreted so as to include the further claim that, in addition to being conscious, the cosmos has 
a facet irreducible to phenomenal properties: the physical universe we can measure. This implies a 
form of dual-aspect monism, a la Spinoza [20, p. 88], so I shall call this interpretation ‘dual-aspect 
cosmopsychism.’ Under dual-aspect cosmopsychism, the cosmos as a whole bears phenomenality, 
but is not constituted by phenomenality. In other words, the cosmos is supposedly conscious, but 
not in consciousness. 
 My goal with this brief essay is to show that the thought processes underlying many of these 
ontologies are flawed, for being based on unexamined assumptions and unwarranted logical 
bridges. Once this is lucidly understood, some of the most important open questions associated with 
these ontologies – which contemporary philosophers see as their job to answer – are exposed as 
artifacts. Indeed, it is my contention that some of the key problems of ontology that contemporary 
philosophers have been grappling with do not actually exist. The next sections will elaborate upon 
this claim. 
 Anticipating a point that is bound to be raised, I acknowledge that offering a coherent 
alternative to the ontologies I am about to criticize is important for the completeness of my 
argument. And as attentive readers will notice, only idealist ontologies – those entailing that all 
existence is essentially phenomenal – are left unscathed by the criticisms in this paper. For this 
reason, I have extensively elaborated on a formulation of idealism elsewhere [10] and also rebutted 
many objections to it [11]. Here, however, I shall limit myself to deconstructing the rationale 
behind the mainstream physicalist ontology and two of its more recent alternatives. Readers 
interested in my formulation of idealism are referred to the works cited above. 
 
2. Thought Artifacts in Physicalism 
 
As discussed in the previous section, physicalism entails the existence of a world outside and 
independent of consciousness, which I shall henceforth refer to as the ‘objective physical world.’ 
This postulate seems to be self-evident from the perspective of modern and post-modern culture, yet 
it is merely a theoretical inference arising from interpretation of sense perceptions. After all, what 
we call the world is available to us solely as ‘images’ – defined here broadly, so to include any 
sensory modality – on the screen of perception, which is itself in consciousness. (To avoid possible 
misinterpretations, notice that my point here is agnostic of whether these perceptual images are a 
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valid given – in the sense of being both epistemically independent and efficacious [17] – or not. My 
point is that, in either case, the objective physical world is surely not a given.) 
Stanford physicist Prof. Andrei Lindeperhaps explained best the inferential nature of the 
objective physical world: 
 
Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with 
perceptions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my “green” exists, and my “sweet” exists. I 
do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything 
else is a theory. Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most 
conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our 
perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon 
we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are 
only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as 
our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. 
But in fact we are substituting reality of our feelings by a successfully working theory of an 
independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never 
think about its limitations until we must address some really deep issues, which do not fit 
into our model of reality [14, p. 12]. 
 
Now, we know that consciousness is perfectly capable to autonomously generate the imagery we 
associate with physicality: dreams and hallucinations, for instance, are often qualitatively 
indistinguishable from the ‘real world.’ Therefore, the motivation for positing the existence of an 
objective physical world must go beyond the mere existence of this imagery. And indeed, what 
physicalism attempts to make sense of are certain basic facts observable in the imagery, such as: 
 
1. The correlations between observed brain activity and reported inner life [cf. 12]; 
2. The fact that we all seem to inhabit the same world; and 
3. The fact that the dynamics of this world unfold independently of personal volition. 
 
After all, if consciousness isn’t a product of objective arrangements of physical elements, how can 
there be such tight correlations between brain activity and experience? If the world isn’t made of 
physical elements outside our individual psyches, how can we all inhabit the same world beyond 
ourselves? If the world isn’t independent of consciousness, why can’t we change the laws of nature 
simply by imagining them to be different? Clearly, thus, the objective physical world posited by 
physicalism is an attempt to make sense of these three basic facts. As such, it is an explanatory 
model, not itself an observation. We imagine that there is an abstract physical world underlying our 
perceptions – and in some sense isomorphic to these perceptions – because doing so helps explain 
the basic facts. 
 Conjuring up an objective physical world to make sense of observations would – at least in 
principle – be legitimate if it didn’t create an insoluble problem known as the ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’ [3], [13]. Indeed, one of physicalism’s key tenets is that consciousness itself must be 
reducible to arrangements of objective physical elements. The problem, of course, is that it is 
impossible to conceive of how or why any particular structural or functional arrangement of 
physical elements would constitute or generate experience [16, pp. 13 – 30], [21, pp. 2 – 30]. The 
qualities of experience are irreducible to the observable parameters of physical arrangements – 
whatever the arrangement is – in the sense that it is impossible to deduce those qualities – even in 
principle – from these parameters [3]. There is nothing about the momentum, mass, charge or spin 
of physical particles, or their relative positions and interactions with one another, in terms of which 
we could deduce the greenness of grass, the sweetness of honey, the warmth of love, or the 
bitterness of disappointment. As long as they fit with the observed correlations between neural 
activity and reported experience, mappings between these two domains are entirely arbitrary: in 
principle, it is as (in)valid to state that spin up generates the feeling of coldness and spin down that 
of warmth as it is to say the exact opposite. There is nothing intrinsic about spin – or about any 
48 
 
other parameter of physical elements or arrangements thereof – that would allow us to make the 
distinction. 
For this reason, neuroscience finds itself positing a slew of conflicting speculative theories 
about the neural constitutors or generators of experience, varying from information integration 
across vast networks of neurons [23] to microscopic intra-neural dynamics [9]. Indeed, as skeptic 
Michael Shermer wrote, “the neuroscience surrounding consciousness” is “nonfalsifiable” [19]. 
Such nonfalsifiability derives from the fact that the logical bridge between the felt qualities of 
experience and the configurations of an abstract world beyond experience is arbitrary. 
 Let us take a step back and unpack the thought process that brought us to this dilemma: first, 
the consciousness of a physicalist wove the conceptual notion that some patterns of its own 
dynamics – namely, those of sense perception – must somehow exist outside itself; then, the 
consciousness of the physicalist tried to project its own essence onto these patterns. The glaring 
artifact of thought here becomes apparent with an analogy: imagine a painter who, having painted a 
self-portrait, points at it and declares himself to be the portrait. This, in essence, is what physicalism 
does. The consciousness of the physicalist conceptualizes self-portraits within itself. Sometimes 
these self-portraits take the form of electrical impulses and neurotransmitter releases in the brain 
[12]. Other times, they take the shape of quantum transitions or potentials [22]. Whatever the case, 
the physicalist’s consciousness always points to a conceptual entity it creates within itself and then 
declares itself to be this entity. It dismisses its own primary, first-person point of view in favor of an 
abstract third-person perspective. Consider Daniel Dennett’s words: “The way to answer these 
‘first-person point of view’ stumpers is to ignore the first-person point of view and examine what 
can be learned from the third-person point of view” [6, p. 336, emphasis added]. The contempt for 
direct experience, primary datum of existence, is palpable here. 
 This arbitrary dislocation of epistemic primacy from direct experience to explanatory 
abstraction is what conjures up the ‘hard problem.’ If we didn’t insist that direct experience must 
somehow be constituted or generated by ‘something beyond’ direct experience, there would be no 
problem. And since this ‘something beyond’ is a conceptual invention derived from an explanatory 
model, the ‘hard problem’ itself is a conceptual invention. 
The issue here is that the invention forces the physicalist into the impossible position of 
having to reduce consciousness to consciousness’s own abstractions. This is as absurd as trying to 
reduce a painter to his paintings; cause to its effects. As such, the ‘hard problem’ is akin to a 
semantic paradox: the difficulty behind it is grounded not in empirical reality, but in its internal 
logico-conceptual structure. 
 For as long as they fail to remain alert to the fact that an objective physical world outside 
consciousness is a conceptual creation of consciousness itself, physicalists will continue to struggle 
with an insoluble problem. Indeed, the fundamental insolubility of the problem is itself a glaring 
hint that something has gone wrong in the underlying thought processes that led to it in the first 
place. 
 
3. Thought Artifacts in Microexperientialism 
 
As we have seen, microexperientialism posits that entities as small as subatomic particles are 
experiencing subjects in their own merit. Microexperientialists imagine that the unitary subjectivity 
of more complex experiencing subjects, such as human beings, arises from bottom-up combination 
of countless simpler subjects. This circumvents the ‘hard problem’ by positing that consciousness is 
a fundamental, irreducible property of ultimates and, as such, does not need to be explained in terms 
of anything else. 
However, another problem immediately arises: the combination of subjects is an 
unexplainable process, perhaps incoherent [5]. It is just as hard as the ‘hard problem’ itself [7]. We 
cannot coherently explain how or why any physical action – such as bringing two subatomic 
particles close together or having them interact in some way – would cause the unification of their 
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subjective points of view, as required by microexperientialism. This is known in contemporary 
philosophy as the ‘subject combination problem’ [4]. And, just like the ‘hard problem,’ it is an 
artifact of thought. 
Indeed, the motivation for microexperientialism is that subatomic particles are the 
discernible ‘pixels’ of the empirical world we perceive around ourselves. But to imagine, for this 
reason, that the subjectivity of living beings is composed of myriad subatomic-level subjects makes 
a rather simple mistake: it attributes to that which experiences a structure discernible only in the 
experience itself. 
Let us unpack this. The notion of fundamental subatomic particles – ultimates – arises from 
experiments whose outcomes are accessible to us only in the form of perception (even when 
delicate instrumentation is used, the output of this instrumentation is only available to us as 
perception). Such experiments show that the images we experience on the screen of perception can 
be divided up into ever-smaller elements, until we reach a limit. At this limit, we find the smallest 
discernible components of the images, which are thus akin to pixels. As such, ultimates are the 
‘pixels’ of experience, not necessarily of the experiencer. The latter does not follow from the 
former. 
Even the fact that human bodies are made of subatomic particles says nothing about the 
structure of the experiencer: what we call a human body is itself an image on the screen of 
perception, and so will necessarily be ‘pixelated’ insofar as it is perceived. Such pixilation reflects 
the idiosyncrasies of the screen of perception, not necessarily the structure of the human subject 
itself. As an analogy, the pixelated image of a person on a television screen reflects the 
idiosyncrasies of the television screen; it doesn’t mean that the person itself is made up of pixels. 
To conclude that a living subject – that is, the consciousness of a living being – is made up 
of a combination of lower-level inanimate subjects requires an extra logical step for which, unless 
we beg the question of ontology, there is no justification. It is analogous to saying, for instance, that 
water is made of ripples simply because one can discern individual ripples in water. Obviously, 
individual ripples make up the structure of the movements of water, not of water itself. 
Analogously, subatomic particles are the ‘pixels’ of the observable ‘movements’ of consciousness, 
not necessarily the building blocks of consciousness itself. We have just as much reason to 
conclude that our subjectivity is composed of myriad subatomic-level subjects as to conclude that 
water is made of ripples. 
Clearly, thus, the ‘combination problem’ of microexperientialism is an artifact of a 
fallacious logical bridge. Just like the ‘hard problem’ faced by physicalism, it is not grounded in 
empirical reality, but in the internal logico-conceptual structure of microexperientialism itself. 
 
4. Thought Artifacts in Dual-Aspect Cosmopsychism 
 
Dual-aspect cosmopsychism is the least problematic ontology among the three criticized in this 
brief essay. By positing that the cosmos as a whole is conscious, the associated cosmic 
consciousness being an irreducible aspect of reality, it circumvents both the ‘hard problem’ and the 
‘combination problem.’ One might then be tempted to conclude that a third, equivalent problem 
must be incurred, which we might call the ‘decomposition problem’: How does one cosmic 
consciousness apparently break up into myriad individual psyches, such as yours and mine? This, 
however, is actually not a fundamental problem, for “a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the 
normal integration of consciousness” [2, p. 191] that can account for the appearance of 
decomposition is well known and understood today, under the label of “dissociation” [1]. 
So what is the thought artifact behind dual-aspect cosmopsychism then? It is the redundant 
and inflationary postulate that the cosmos as a whole is a “bearer of consciousness” [18, p. 408, 
emphasis added], as opposed to being constituted by consciousness. For the cosmos to bear 
consciousness there must be something to it – some aspect of it – beyond consciousness itself, 
which can in turn carry consciousness. Otherwise, what sense is there in saying that consciousness 
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bears consciousness? This postulate of dual-aspect cosmopsychism may be an unexamined 
concession to the reigning physicalist view that there exists something beyond phenomenality. By 
accommodating this view, dual-aspect cosmopsychism certainly becomes more digestible under the 
contemporary zeitgeist. However, the key challenge incumbent upon cosmopsychism is to explain 
how a unitary cosmic consciousness can give rise to apparently distinct individual psyches. The 
idea of a physically objective facet of the cosmos is not necessary or helpful for tackling and 
overcoming such a challenge [cf. 15], [18]. Therefore, by accommodating the physicalist view that 
there exists something beyond phenomenality, dual-aspect cosmopsychism also ends up 
incorporating a redundant and inflationary postulate. 
 If the notion of an objective physical world is left out of cosmopsychism, the latter boils 
down to idealism: the view that the cosmos as a whole is in consciousness – as opposed to being 
conscious – and that individual psyches arise from a process of top-down dissociation in cosmic 
consciousness [10]. Although idealism faces challenges regarding its explanatory power – that is, its 
ability to make sense of the facts that we all seem to share the same world outside the control of our 
volition, that physical interference with the brain clearly affects inner experience, etc. – it does not 
fall victim to any of the artifacts of thought discussed in this essay. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The key philosophical problems faced by today’s most popular ontologies – such as the ‘hard 
problem of consciousness’ faced by physicalism and the ‘subject combination problem’ faced by 
microexperientialism – are artifacts of unexamined assumptions and fallacious logical bridges 
inherent to their respective ontologies, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to 
semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of these ontologies. 
The sooner philosophers become lucid of this fact, the sooner philosophical thought can move 
towards more constructive avenues of inquiry. 
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